The major theoretical debates in international relations theory
O artigo a seguir, escrito originalmente em inglês, versa sobre as características das principais abordagens teorícas usadas no campo das relações internacionais.
Abstract: This article encompasses a theoretical reflection about the major theoretical debates that cross the field of international relations, namely: realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. Finally, we will discuss the rationality of the games that states play, opposing constructivism to Game Theory, in order to investigate its main differences and/or methodological limitations. Despite the richness of the various theories that shape the field of international relations, we believe that the games nations play are best understood by the use of hermeneutic analysis, aided by a constructivist perspective, which seeks to interpret the action from 'within', focusing on understanding the reasons for the actions of states, through which they define their identity and may or may not change their interests as a result of their interaction with the social world.
Key words: Game Theory; Constructivism; Realism; Neoliberal institutionalism
Introduction
In this article, we try to highlight the main features of the major theoretical approaches in the field of international relations. As such, we will explain the main differences between realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. At a later stage, we will describe Game Theory, according to a rationalist perspective and by opposition to a constructivist conception. We assume that games played by states cannot be solely explained by a rationalist point of view, i.e., by the 'mechanical' assumptions of Game Theory. Rather than that, states' action lacks interpretation, a vision 'from within' that is only possible by means of a hermeneutic analysis. This analysis searches for behaviour causality, based on interaction between actors, on social construction and on interests of several players. Although constructivism does not limit reality to a mechanistic action-reaction, it does see social activity as something based on rules that set players' interaction.
Let's begin by analysing the realist approach on international relations.
Realism can be understood as the political theory of economic nationalism: its main idea suggests that government economic activities must remain subordinate to the goal of state-building (Siitonen, 1990). Based on such assumptions, the realist paradigm has considerably dominated debates and research in international relations during the post-War period, in the United States and Europe (Vasquez, 1983). In realist thinking, international society is fundamentally in a Hobbesian "state of anarchy", driven by "the pursuit of power" (Siitonen, 1990: 20). As a matter of fact, Victor Marques dos Santos states that "political realism describes an essentially anarchic international society in which the actors survive in the best possible way in an inevitable 'state of nature' " (2007: 243).
According to Stephen Blank,"actors act according to the old tenets of realism and realpolitik" (1999: 150). On the other hand, many of the measures they take, aiming to increase their political influence, subscribe to the logic of market economy. Therefore, realist and neorealist schools admit that "the survival of the nation-state is the ultimate purpose of governance developed by the apparatus of power". (…) ) "All policies are defined as a "power struggle" (Santos, 2007: 242). In this respect, power " is conceptualised as a means and an end in itself, and its general meaning is the ability to influence or change the behaviour of others in a desired direction, or alternatively, the ability to resist such influences on their own behaviours" (Santos , 2007: 242).
However, this does not imply that among countries reigns a state of endless war (Tidstrom, 2006). Instead, states are organized in terms of anarchic hierarchy, according to their differences in power (Tidstrom, 2006). With the aid of two mechanisms, the state may, at least temporarily, operate peacefully: the hegemonic leadership that facilitates cooperation, and the balance of power, which discourages conflict (McKinlay and Little, 1986). Building on these principles, states are likely to create alliances among themselves (McKinlay and Little, 1986). A fundamental intellectual convention of realist paradigm is the distinction between state and civil society: "the realist conception maintains the distinction between the two spheres, with foreign policy emerging beyond the sphere of civil society" (Siitonen, 1990: 20). One can explain the international system in terms of national needs and desires (or "national interests" expressed by the behaviour of the state (Siitonen, 1990: 21)). The goal for national security is the survival of the state, instead of ensuring international security (Haftendorn, 1991: 8).
The strength of the realist standard, regarding the conceptualisation of international relations, lies in its tendency to legitimize the international status quo: "while power and wealth are regarded as attributes of national entities defined as states (and by states), the role of civil societies in international relations tends to remain subordinate" (Cox, 1981: 2). A product of an alleged uncertainty, a central theme in almost all realist theory is the "security dilemma" (Herz, 2003). Due to their continuous efforts to "ensure their own security and survival", states are taken to "acquire more and more power" (COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2007: 23). In turn, thisthreatens the security of other states. Traditional concepts of the Cold War, as well as nuclear and deterrence strategies, give more prominence to this line of thought (COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2007: 23). Inevitably, efforts to achieve maximum security against a possible attack produce, more insecurity "since no one can feel totally safe in a competitive world, the competition for power remains and the vicious circle of security and accumulation of power continues" (Herz, 1976: 10).
Regarding the cooperation between less hegemonic powers, such as small industrialized countries (the 'middle powers'), or less developed states, the realist paradigm has lost much of its charm. The main criticism to this concerns the perception of states as unitary actors for understanding international relations. This fundamental principle represents the state as “a closed, impermeable and sovereign unity, completely separated from all other states” (Wolfers, 1974: 58). Abolishing this fundamental assumption has given rise to competing paradigms, one of which is the self-entitled liberal paradigm of international relations (Siitonen, 1990). With the détente between the superpowers in the early 1970s, several scholars focusing on interdependence began to question the basic assumptions of the realist perspective (Keohane and Nye, 1971). Rejecting the view of international relations as a 'jungle', "liberals conceive international politics as an 'arable garden', which combines 'state of war' with the possibility of ‘state of peace'" (Doyle, 1997: 19). Firstly, "the vision of the state as the main actor was challenged by an interest in transnational actors, mainly transnational corporations" (Siitonen, 1990: 24). Secondly, "the distinction between domestic and international spheres was contradicted by a growing sense of interdependence among the states, mainly through economic transactions" (Siitonen, 1990: 24). Finally, the vision of international relations as a struggle for power had its results checked against those of the idea of harmony of interests in the long term, which prevails in an international economic liberal order (Vasquez, 1983 and Gilpin, 1987). Unlike classical realists, liberals believe in the goodness of human nature and its ability to deter aggression. Their main tenet is that war can be avoided, with far more potential for cooperation if the condition of anarchy is reduced. Overall, "global change is possible"(Jervis,1999: 43).
The costs and dangers of war lead liberals to reject it. Therefore, war will only tend to happen if it's aim is to increase self -preservation and well-being. This motivation is "self-interested" and is not based "in what is perceived as fair" (Owen, 1994, 95-96). Many liberals also believe that "the rule of law, limitations on state power, the transparency of government and democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, particularly when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions" (Snyder, 2004: 56). In a "globalised environment" in which the international system is integrated, new actors as "transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations" will facilitate the interdependence between states which, in turn, will lead to "a peaceful international environment" (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 43). Liberals argue that "the interests of a state are not determined by its place in the international system, but by its various interests, ideals, and the activities of its members reflect, albeit temporarily, the government’s authority" (Doyle 1997: 19).
While the initial assumptions between classical realism and neorealism may vary, "the anarchic character of the system and the formation of states’ preferences are quite similar" (Muller, 2002: 371). Briefly, here are the main differences between classical realism and neorealism. Firstly, "classical realism assigns the causes of international conflict and war to the imperfect nature of human behaviour, while neorealists argue that the roots of conflicts are due to the anarchic nature of the international system" (Hobson, 2000: 17). Secondly, "the state is ontologically superior to the system in classical realism, contrary to what happens in neorealism (…)" (Hobson, 2000: 17). Thirdly, "classical realists distinguish between powers of the status quo and revisionist powers, while neorealism conceives states as unitary actors" (Schweller, 1996: 155). On the other hand, "neorealists seek to devote a more rigorous and scientific approach to the study of international politics, strongly influenced by the behavioural revolution of the 60s, while the classical realism limits its analysis to subjective assessments of international relations" (Georg and Sorensen, 2007: 75).
Kenneth Waltz has distanced himself from the classical realism in two critical aspects, as shown by the prefix 'neo'. Firstly, "the previous generation of realists had based its theory of international politics in the knowledge of human nature, but also in the 'will of power' of Morgenthau" (Ruggie, 1998: 7). Instead, Waltz materialized the premise and promise of his initial question: "no man, or state are ultimately responsible for war or any other recurring income in international politics; instead, the structure of anarchy and its effects are" (Ruggie, 1998: 7). Secondly, "while classical realism tended to mix the first principles with historical observation and prudential judgement, Waltz adopted a hypothetical-deductive method, which is characteristic of the natural sciences and economics" (Ruggie 1998: 7). For Waltz, the international system is individualistic as to its origin, being more or less spontaneously generated as a by-product of the actions of its constituent units , "whose objectives and efforts are focused not on creating an order, but, rather, on fulfilling their own interests defined internally by any means they may add" (1979 : 90).
However, there are limitations to the neorealist approach. Neorealism underestimates the extent to which cooperation depends on a set of habits of cooperation, shared values and rules taken for granted. Also, its assumption that preferences are given exogenously reduces multilateralism to a matter of strategic interaction, making it difficult to understand multilateralism driven by collective beliefs, habits and shared values (Caporaso, 1993: 82). Finally, "the absence of a historical narrative discourages exploitation of counter-arguments and supports the view that the agreements, including the institutional ones, are what they are because they are functional responses to environmental challenges or because they reflect the distribution of the dominant power" (Caporaso, 1993: 82).
Regarding liberal institutionalism, this accepts many of the realism tenets on the continuing importance of military power in international relations, but argues that "institutions can provide a framework for cooperation, likely to help overcome the dangers of the security competition between states" (Baylis, 2001: 262). The fact that norms and institutions are important is no surprise to the 'new institutionalists' in international relations; after all, this has been their message (Keohane, 1988). But they have paid little attention to a fundamental feature of the current international institutional arrangements: their multilateral form"(Ruggie, 1998: 105). Many new institutionalists have focused in cooperation and institutions, in general, with international regimes and formal organizations sometimes designed as specific institutional subsets (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986).
Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism were able to converge to the current point "because they now share very similar analytical foundations" (Ruggie, 1998: 9). Both perceive the existence of international anarchy as "an established fact", although they may differ as to its cause (Ruggie, 1998: 9). Both stipulate that states are the main actors in international politics. Moreover, both argue that identities and interests of states are acquired a priori and exogenously (Ruggie 1998: 9). Based on these assumptions,"both assume that states are rational actors who seek to maximize their expected utility, defined in terms of power, security and welfare" (Ruggie, 1998: 9). However, there are several analytical differences between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Among the most significant, Stephen Krasner stresses that while neorealism argues that "the key concept is survival", for neoliberals it involves "resolving market failures" (1997: 16). In other words, Krasner points out the fact that neorealists and neoliberal prioritize two different effects of anarchy. Neorealists tend to focus on the fact that the potential use of force is always present in international relations and it affects the calculations of states (Carlsnaes, 2002). As such, these are bound to be concerned not only with how much they gain from cooperation in absolute terms, but also with how much they earn in relation to third parties, who may become enemies tomorrow (Grieco, 1998). In turn, neoliberals are more likely to explore the impediments that anarchy imposes on states, in their attempt to achieve and maintain agreements, even when there are common interests to cooperate (Grieco, 1998). Another difference between the two theoretical currents is directly related to the role of institutions. According to Mearsheimer, who is a perfect example of the neorealist position on those, "the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, if not increase it" (Ruggie, 1998: 10). In turn, neoliberalism assigns a greater weight to institutions, although "focusing on market failures and not on power relations" (Ruggie, 1998: 10).
In After Hegemony (1984), Robert Keohane analyses why cooperation continues, sometimes between states, in the absence of a hegemon. Using microeconomic theory of cooperation in order to explore economic cooperation between states, this author believes that its principles have relevance in other areas of international relations (Keohane, 1984). According to Keohane, unlike the Hobbesian vision which compares international politics to a "state of war", the 'institutionalist' tradition states that shared economic interests create a "harmony of interests" between states which, in turn, generate a search for international institutions and rules that states are likely to follow on a voluntary basis (1984: 7). Keohane has an affinity with the institutionalist belief in the possibility of cooperation between states. However, this affinity is not based on excessive optimism, on a logic of "harmony of interests"; rather, his argument is based on what he sees as "solid empirical evidence of cooperation between states in modern international relations" (Keohane, 1984: 7).
Keohane's goal is to demonstrate that realistic assumptions about international relations, presenting states as rational egoists, are consistent with the institutionalist ideas on how rules and principles promote cooperation among states. He argues that the predominant realist approach (the theory of hegemonic stability) does not explain adequately the phenomenon of cooperation in international relations (Herbert, 1996). According to Keohane, "where there are common interests, realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and the role of institutions" (1993: 277). The author criticizes the theories of hegemonic stability in order to develop an approach capable of offering a more complete explanation of international cooperation. His effort is not to refute the realist logic on the determinants of interest and distribution of power among states in a condition of anarchy. As an alternative, the purpose of Keohane is to introduce the institutional setting of state action ignored by the realist analysis (1993).
During the creation of his 'functional theory of regimes', Keohane alters the meanings of certain central concepts of realist theory, both to highlight the boundaries of conventional realistic usage, and to articulate concepts endowed with greater explanatory power (1984). Keohane’s analysis (1984 ) begins with certain assumptions shared by realists:(1) the international system is composed of selfish states , i.e. self- interested, rational actors wishing to maximize their wealth and power; and (2) the international system is a condition of anarchy, that is, a system of decentralized authority. However, "Keohane later 'eases' one of the key tenets of the realist approach, namely that states are selfish utility maximizers who seek to maximize their short-term gains, in order to understand how this change of assumptions affects his theory of regimes" (Herbert, 1996: 6). The 'functional theory of regimes' of Keohane seeks to explain how the patterns of ruled-oriented political coordination emerge, remain, and fall in global economic policy. He designates the theory as 'functional' because the beneficial effect of the rules is the causal agent explaining why the cooperative and rule-governed behaviour comes to be (Keohane, 1984). Institutions contribute to cooperation, by not imposing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context in which they make decisions based on self-interest. The author defines cooperation in a deliberately unconventional way (Keohane, 1984). 'Cooperation', a concept that Keohane regards as highly political, is checked against 'discord' and distinguished from 'harmony', an apolitical concept in his theory. The cooperation often presumes that the parties negotiate in order to reach a "mutual adjustment" in behaviour, a different process from "harmony", which the author compares to"… common interest" (Keohane, 1984: 12). Keohane argues that the distinction between cooperation and harmony is needed as discord may prevail even where there is common interest. Therefore, cooperation cannot be regarded simply as a function of common interests; instead, it becomes a potential goal for states. In order to develop his theory, Keohane uses a combination of logic from game theory, rational choice theory and economic metaphors (1984). The author explains how game theory, particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma, shows the possibility of the emergence of cooperation between 'selfish' players, even in the absence of a common Government (1984). The degree of such cooperation will depend on the existence of international 'institutions' or 'regimes', defined generally as "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge" (Herbert 1996: 229).
Contrary to neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism, the constructivist view has no direct precedent in international relations theory (Adler, 1999). As a more current strand of idealism, constructivism earned a prominent place in debates about international relations theory in recent years (COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2007). Basically, constructivism attempts to address that which neo-utilitarianism assumes: the identity and/or interests of the actors. It perceives international politics on the basis of a more "relational ontology", in the words of Carol Gilligan (1995). In addition, constructivism assigns to ideational factors – such as culture, norms and ideas – social effectiveness over any functional utility they may have, including the task of tracing the path in which actors define their identity and interests first (Wendt, 1994, 1995; Katzenstein , 1996b). Constructivist theory emphasizes the impact of ideas and identities, although constructivist approaches are quite different and do not provide a unified set of predictions about any of these issues (Wendt, 1994, 1995; Katzenstein, 1996b). Unlike positivism and materialism, which take "the world as it is", constructivism sees "the world as a project under construction", in becoming rather than being (Adler, 2002: 95). Contrary to idealism, post-structuralism and post-modernism, that understand the world only as it can be imagined or spoken, "constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemological value and that there is therefore some basis to knowledge" (Adler, 2002: 95).
Wendt explains that neorealists understand the structure of the international system as "a distribution of material capabilities", because they focus on their object through a materialist lens; neoliberals, in turn, see it as "capabilities plus institutions "because they added an institutional superstructure to the materialist basis "(1999 : 5). But for constructivists,, it refers to "a whole distribution of ideas "because they have an idealistic ontology (Wendt, 1999: 5). Constructivists believe that "international relations consist primarily of social facts, which are only facts by human agreement" (Wendt, 1999: 206). Constructivists are "ontological realists", albeit constructivism is "a shy attempt of building a bridge between positivist/materialist and idealist/interpretive philosophies" (Wendt, 1999: 206).
Constructivists seek to expand the empirical and explanatory fields of international relations theory beyond the analytical limits of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism: "questioning the identities and interests of states; expanding the ideational set of factors that affect international results; introducing constitutive rules alongside regulative norms, and realizing the transformation as a regular feature of international politics that systemic theory must encompass although its empirical occurrence is episodic and moves in a different timeline of daily life" (Ruggie 1998: 26).
The neo-utilitarian approach has too narrow a view of the role of ideas in social life, and is unable to answer to "how the constituent actors – i.e. the states – acquire their identity and interests" (Ruggie, 1998: 14). On the other hand, neo-utilitarianism has no analytical means to address the fact that the identities of certain states shape their interests (Ruggie, 1998: 14). Goldstein and Keohane define ideas as "beliefs of individuals" (1993: 3). If this assumption is actually real, as only individuals may have ideas or beliefs, "the reverse proposition, that all beliefs are individual beliefs, – does not follow" (Ruggie, 1998: 20). It is the result of methodological individualism on which neo-utilitarianism is based (Ruggie, 1998: 20). Instead, constructivism also deals in the field of "intersubjective beliefs" (Ruggie, 1998: 20). According to Cohen, "there is a collective knowledge shared by all those capable of committing to or recognising the appropriate role of a social practice or set of practices" (1987: 287). As stated by Emanuel Adler, this knowledge persists beyond the life of individual actors, imbued with routines and social practices, which are played by interpreters who participate in its production and development" (1999: 212). Simultaneously, the concept of intersubjectivity does not presume the existence of a collective mind nor denies the fact that individuals have purposes and intentions (Adler, 1999: 212). Instead, it is based on the notion that "each of us has their own thoughts; we share our ideas with our fellow-men" (Toulmin, 1972: 35). According to Schutz, "the social world is intersubjective because we live in it (…) understanding others and being understood by them" (1964: 10).
The concept of collective identity when it comes to intersubjective meanings matches those ideas described by Cox as "intersubjective meanings or common notions of the nature of social relationships, which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour" (1981: 98). Ruggie also highlights the importance of "intersubjective beliefs" in terms of social facts whose foundation is the "collective intentionality" (1998a: 869). Here underlies the critique of individualist theories that "reduce everything, including ideas, to individuals" (Schünemann, 2008: 73). Regarding the collective intentionality, Searle points out that this concept does not presume "the existence of a Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, or something equally implausible" (1995, 25-26). According to Searle, intentionality "refers not only to intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, anger, fun, and all mental states (conscious or unconscious) that relate to the outside world" (1984: 16). Social facts, in the world of 'intentionality' both influence action and "make intelligible to others the grounded reasoning behind actions" (Ruggie, 1998: 90).
Neo-utilitarianism has, among others, as a major limitation the lack of a concept of constitutive rules. For neorealists, for example, "the rules do not matter in itself, but only insofar as they reflect, or are supported by the power of influential actors" (Hurrell, 2002: 145). In a setting of interaction between actors and structures, standards mean an intersubjective structure and help create identities (Gilson, 2002: 18). According to John Ruggie, "norms may guide behaviour, may inspire behaviour, rationalize or justify behaviour, they may express mutual expectations about behaviour, or they may be ignored", but "they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death" (in Hurrell, 2002: 145). Constructivist writing has higlighted the importance of constitutive rules (Kratochwill, 1989; Onuf, 1989). Wittgenstein followers claim all social activities should be governed by certain constitutive rules, "because actions have a meaning that behaviour does not have" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 179). On the other hand, "social action can only occur where the rules are followed" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 179). The rules are constructed by agreement or convention, even if tacitly or, in the extreme, unconsciously (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 179).
Katzenstein differentiates between constitutive norms, which "specify actions that will make other relevant actors recognize and validate a concrete identity, and respond appropriately to it", and regulative norms, which "operate as standards to adequately enact or establish a defined identity " (1996: 54). The constitutive rules represent "interpretations/shared notions of behaviour patterns" (Klotz, 1995: 14). Ruggie recalls that the main reason why neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists lack a concept of constitutive rules is because these were imported from economic theory, particularly microeconomics: "It is universally recognized that economy is embedded in broader social, institutional, political and legal structures, that make possible the conduct of economic relations" (1998a: 871). Modern economic theory does not explain the origins of markets, but instead takes its existence for granted. The problem arises because, when neo-utilitarian models are imported into other fields, they leave behind those constituent frames" (Ruggie, 1998a: 871). On the other hand, the absence of a concept of constitutive rules in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is also due to the fact that these "explain the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of conducting international relations: not territorial states, not systems of states, not any international order, nor the whole host of institutional forms that states use" (Ruggie, 1998: 23). Meanwhile, regarding international relations, constructivists have failed to develop a theory of constitutive rules, although the phenomenon itself constitutes a central concern for them, since constitutive rules are the institutional basis of all social life (Kratochwil, 1989:Onuf, 1989).
The distinctive feature of constructivism is that it "concerns itself with the nature, origins and functioning of social facts" (Ruggie, 1998: 13). Alexander Wendt argues that the realist conception of anarchy does not adequately explain why conflict happens between states. The real question, he says, has to do with how anarchy is understood: 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, 1992 ). The states claim that anarchy is a concept consisting of actors who share the same rules and constitutive practices. Constructivism provides an understanding of, or gives meaning to, situations and intentions. For example, "constructivism does not solve the security dilemma (certainty is not a source of security), but reduces uncertainty" (Hopf 1998: 174). The system of states is embedded in a society of states, which includes sets of values, rules, and institutions that are commonly accepted by states and which make it possible for the system of states to function (Ruggie, 1998: 11).
According to John Baylis, constructivism is based on two main assumptions: "the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed", and "changing the way we think about international relations can contribute to the strengthening of international security" (1997: 266). According to Muller (2002), constructivists put too much emphasis on change – individual and collective learning, defined as the change of basic ideas on security – and a subsequent adaptation of constitutive and regulative norms that shape the environment is the mechanism through which change emerges. Fearon and Wendt outline at least four features in the constructivist conception on the construction of objects and social practices. Firstly, "constructivism is centrally concerned with the role of ideas in the construction of social life", explaining that "constructivism is not subjectivism or pure idealism" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57). Secondly, constructivism focuses on "showing the socially constructed nature of the actors", so that instead of taking them as "given in explaining the social, as rationalists tend to do", constructivists are interested "into making them the dependent variable" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57). Thirdly, "constructivism is based on a research strategy of methodological holism rather than methodological individualism" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57). Indeed, according to Julia Schünemann "the insistence on the mutual constitution of actors and structures opposes the (methodological) individualism of rationalist approaches, according to which individual acts represent the basic unit of social life" (2008: 48). In this respect, the author explains that "rational choice approaches differ in key aspects from the constructivist approach, as the former argue in terms of action and society, ' bottom-up’, i.e. from the actors to the social structures" (Schünemann, 2008: 48). Constructivism adopts a notion of causality that takes social motivations as causes (Giddens, 1984). However, since people do "what is required" based on "standards and rules that are derived from historical and cultural circumstances", such standards and rules structure and, therefore, "cause" what people do, i.e. form actors with a direction and goals for action (Adler, 1999: 216).
Recent events seem to reaffirm the 'resurgence' of constructivist theory. According to Snyder, "a theory that emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion and transnational networks seems highly relevant to the understanding of the world post-September 11, 2001" (2004: 59-60). Echoes of the constructivist approach can be found, for example, in recent studies of globalisation, social movements and terrorism. In the last two decades there was also "an explosion of interest in the concepts of culture and identity, a development that meets the constructivist emphasis on the importance of ideas and norms" (Walt, 1998: 42). Hence, security and insecurity are essentially related to competition and the inconsistency between social identities. In this context, Appadurai has recently introduced the concept of 'predatory identities'. By 'predatory' the author means "the identities whose social construction and mobilization require the extinction of the other" (2006: 51).
The collective identity can be thought of in three different ways. Firstly, it may allude to "the limits/boundaries of the group", gauging "who may or may not be considered part of this group"; secondly, it can relate "to the attributes of a group member prototype…"; thirdly, the identity can refer to the "relationship assumed by a collective actor in relation to other collective actors" (Richard Herrmann, 2002: 130). The world that constructivists create is "neither better nor worse than the world idealized by neorealists and neoliberals" (Adler, 2002: 100). However, it is "a broader, contingent, unexpected and surprising world" (Adler, 2002: 100). The 'great debates' traversing the field of International Relations over the past decades have been broadly rooted in the "alleged superiority of one conception over another" (Ruggie, 1998: 36). However, the fact that these debates occur with such regularity is proof that "no conception can legitimately claim a monopoly on truth" (Ruggie, 1998: 36). The current meeting between neo-utilitarianism and constructivism presents as additional feature the fact that "the strengths of each approach are also the source of their major limitations" (Ruggie, 1998: 36). Hoping to achieve a deeper and clearer understanding on the structure and functioning of world politics, neo-utilitarians should seek to expand their analytical foundations, and constructivists should endeavour to conquer a greater rigour (Ruggie, 1998: 39). Both conceptions are not additive, and it is unlikely that they meet and merge into a happy medium term. But by extending their limits, it is likely to find out when an approach integrates the other, when they seek to explain the same phenomenon, and when one complements the other (Jepperson et al, 1996).
Compared to neo-utilitarianism – whose main limitation lies in the grounds of its axiomatic structure, in its ontology, which for some purposes has serious limitations, and leads to an incomplete or distorted view of reality – constructivism "rests on a deeper and broader ontology, thereby providing a richer understanding of some phenomena and shedding light on other aspects of international life that, quite literally, do not exist within the neo-utilitarian rendering of the world polity" (Ruggie, 1998: 37). However, constructivism is not a substantive theory, i.e. an empirically grounded theory of international relations, as it is at a level of theorizing that investigates questions on the fundamental nature of things, the constitution of the actors and their interaction (Wendt, 1999; Ruggie, 1998a; Risse, 2003 and 2004; Krell, 2004; Checkel, 1998; Adler, 1997). It is therefore more appropriate, according to Ruggie, to speak of a perspective or a philosophical and theoretical approach: (…) constructivists of international relations have not yet managed to devise a theory of constitutive rules" (Ruggie, 1998: 23). On the other hand, according to Emanuel Adler, there is "little clarity and even less consensus about the nature and substance" of the constructivist approach (1999: 202). This author explains that:
"The reliance of constructivist International Relations theory on interpretive social theory and vocabulary; the mistaken belief that constructivism, post-structuralism and post-modernism are all varieties of the same ‘reflectivist’ approach; the relative scarcity of early constructivist empirical research; and, most important, the debates within constructivism itself as to ‘what constructivism is really about’ — all these have tended to obscure constructivism’s scientific basis, its preference for ontology and epistemology over methodology, and its potential contribution to a better understanding of International Relations.(Adler, 1999: 202).
Therefore, "constructivism remains more of a philosophical and theoretically informed perspective, focusing on the empirical study of international relations" (Ruggie, 1998a: 856). According to Checkel, "the main challenge for constructivists consists in the development of theory" (1998: 325). Having proved that constructivism is important, "now [constructivists] have to address when, how and why [any given phenomenon] occurs, clearly specifying the actors, the conditions under which they operate, and how they vary according to countries" (Checkel, 1998: 325). To accomplish this, constructivists must integrate their knowledge in theories of intermediate-range (middle-range theory) (Checkel, 1998: 325).
The rationality of the states’ games: game theory versus constructivism
Game Theory had its foray into the academic field in 1944, with the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Its impact was immediately recognized through numerous applications and extensions to the branch of Social Sciences, including Political Science and almost all of its subfields, including International Relations. Game Theory is, as Bernhard von Stengel mentions, "the formal study of conflict and cooperation" (2011: 1). In turn , according to Uwe Haneke and Vitoria Saddi, Game Theory is "a method to analyze situations of conflict and cooperation which depend on the strategic behaviour", in a setting where "the actions of agents depend, in part, of what other than agents can do" (1995: 59). That said, according toKevin Leyton-Brownand Yoav Shoham, Game Theory is the "mathematical study of interaction between agents … [powered by their] own interests " (2008: 47).
The earliest example of a formal analysis of Game Theory is the study of a duopoly, by Antoine Cournot (1838), in 1838. One of the key assumptions in Cournot is, as noted by Roger B. Myerson, that "the contestants make their decisions independently" (1999: 9). The mathematician Emile Borel (1921) suggested a Theory of Games in 1921, which was developed in 1928 by John von Neumann in a 'theory of parlor games' (Leonard, 1995). Returning to Myerson, both Borel and von Neumann "departed from the traditional assumption that in the existence of uncertainty, players tend to maximize the value of the expected return" (1999: 11).
In 1950, John Nash showed that "finite games always have an equilibrium point, in which the various stakeholders make the decisions they believe to be the most appropriate, taking into consideration the choices of their opponents" (1950 : 48-49). According to Turocy and von Stengel, "in the 50s and 60s, the field of Game Theory was expanded and applied to problems of war and politics", and "since the 70s has led a revolution in economic theory" (2001: 3-4). Moreover, it has been applied to psychology and sociology, and has established ties with biology, among other areas(Swedberg, 2001; Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008). Game Theory was given special attention in 1994 with the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Haneke and Saddi, 1995).
Game Theory would come to be particularly significant at the level of resolution of interstate conflicts. Theoretical models have been gaining an ever increasing sophistication, therefore becoming more powerful and useful. According to Walt, "rational choice models were accepted within the academic study of politics in the 50s, but its popularity has grown significantly in recent years" (1999: 5). It should be added that "students perceive increasingly the use of formal models of rational choice as a prerequisite for professional advancement", and moreover, "search using methods of rational choice has become widespread …"(Walt, 1999: 5).
The synergy between Game Theory and International Relations, which occurred after the publication of the pioneering work Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), was centred on issues of security and defence, a trend that has carried on since then. The threat to the Western world, embodied by the USSR, was replaced by another less significant threat, Russia. The contributions of Nash (1950, 1951, 1953, 1996), Harsanyi (1967-1968, 1973), Selten (1965, 1975), and Maynard – Smith (1973) helped expand Game Theory beyond the issues addressed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Hector Correa, "the main applications of Game Theory to the field of international relations are, still, quite limited to analysing interactions – based on security and defence – among states" (2001: 4).
The theoretical concepts of game apply whenever the actions of the several agents are interdependent. Such agents can be individuals, groups, companies, or a combination thereof . The concepts of Game Theory provide tools to formulate, organize, analyse and understand strategic scenarios (Weintraub, 1992). As Martin Osborne (2003) notes, Game Theory helps us to understand situations in which decision-makers interact and compete with each other according to a set of rules.
In the study of International Relations, it is quite common to start with the assumption that actors’ choices are interdependent (Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld, 2010). This interdependence leads to a strategic thinking that is often too complex for the investigator. Game Theory provides a set of tools capable of providing in-depth analysis of such interactions. Given the actors’ preferences and the strategic environment in which they operate and interact, Game Theory helps us to infer how they assess the various policies available to them, and to determine the expected result(s) from the interaction of their choices (Nesmith , 1981). In practice, Game Theory plays an important role in research, explanation or prescription, helping to make intelligible processes that appear to be complex, without assigning, however, causality to factors such as incompetence, irresponsibility, or lack of concern of decision-makers. For example, as stated by Allan and Dupont, "the security-known dilemma of realism can be illuminated by the study of the 'prisoner's dilemma' … 23).
The object of study of Game Theory is precisely the game, which is a formal model of an interactive situation. According to Myerson (1997), a game refers to any social situation involving two or more individuals. According to Robert J. Aumann and Jacques H. Dreze, "a game is defined by its set of strategies and rewards, although in real life, it is important to take into account many other parameters (…) (2008: 72). It may happen that several quite different situations match, however, the same strategic game. Games can be described based on various levels of detail. As Theodore L.Turocy and Bernhard von Stengel mention, "a cooperative game" specifies "the gains that each group or alliance can get through cooperation among its members" (2001: 6). Cooperative theory investigates such games when it comes to the relative amount of power held by the various stakeholders, or how a successful alliance should split its gains (Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs, 2008). This is more prone to be applied to situations emerging in the setting of Political Science or International Relations, where concepts such as power are critical. For example, Nash (1950) offered a solution to the division of gains in a negotiation problem that depends solely on the relative strength of the bargaining position of both parties. The amount of power that a party has is determined by the result, usually inefficient, which comes from the breakdown of negotiations. To Turocy and von Stengel, the Nash model fits in the cooperative scenario as it "does not describe a specific deadline for proposals and counterproposals", but "focuses exclusively on the outcome of the negotiation process" (2001: 6).
The idea underlying cooperative theory has, according to Aumann, been transmitted as follows: "cooperative theory starts with a formalization of the games which completely disregards procedures and focuses instead on the possibilities of agreement… 8). There are several reasons that explain why cooperative games have become the target of a particular treatment. One is that, according to Aumann, "when you integrate procedures of negotiation and execution in the model , then the results of an uncooperative analysis depend highly on the exact shape of the procedures, on the act of making proposals and counterproposals, and so on" (1989, 8). 8). This may be appropriate in voting situations, in which the procedures/rules of parliamentary nature prevail, where a good strategist can indeed get the upper hand. However, the problems of negotiation are generally more heterogeneous and it is too complex to define exactly which procedures take place. According to Aumann, "there is an awareness that the procedures are not so important, and that, instead, the possibilities of forming alliances, of promising and threatening prove to be decisive" (1989: 9).
In turn, non-cooperative theory focuses on the analysis of strategic choices. According to Jacco Thijssen (2006), "non-cooperative game theory is, in practice, the mathematical theory of conflict". Unlike Nash’s cooperative model, a non-cooperative model of negotiation describes a process in which it is pre-set who starts making an offer at any given time. The term 'non- cooperative' means, as Turocy and von Stengel explain, that this branch of Game Theory "influences the process of the players making choices in their own interest" (2001: 6-7). Still according to these authors, "cooperation can arise models of non-cooperative games whenever the players consider that this suits their best interests" (2001: 7).
As Adam Brandenburger highlights, "the concepts of 'non-cooperative theory' and 'cooperative theory' turn out to be reductive since they may suggest that non-cooperative theory is incompatible with the possibility of cooperation, or that there may be no place for conflict in cooperative theory" (2007: 1). In fact, that is not so. According to Brandenburger, "a part of the non-cooperative theory (the theory of repeated games) studies the possibility of cooperation in relations "; in turn, cooperative theory encompasses not only "cooperation between actors", but also "the competition, particularly intense, and without restrictions" among them (2007: 1). Leyton-Brown and Shoam explain that "the essential difference" between the two branches is that in "non- cooperative theory the basic unit is the individual (including its beliefs, preferences and possible actions),"while "in cooperative theory, the basic unit is the group" (2008: 47). Moreover, while for non-cooperative theory a game is a detailed model with all possible options for the players, cooperative theory describes only the results that arise when the players converge in different combinations (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
Besides the distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative, the branches of the Game Theory also differ regarding the assumptions on which they are based. A central idea in many variants of Game Theory is, as Aumann and Dreze stress, the fact that the players are "rational" (2008: 73). A rational player is one who always chooses a particular action that gives him the desired result, bearing in mind what he expects his opponents to do. In other words, "a player is rational if the choice of its strategy maximizes the expected return" (Aumann and Dreze, 2008: 73). Therefore, Game Theory's goal is to predict how the game will be played by rational actors, or to advise on the best possible position in a game with rational contenders (Kagel and Roth, 1997).
Finally, let us carry on a brief distinction between some concepts introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), when these authors created the mathematical theory of games in 1944. According to Steven Pinker, a zero-sum game is an interaction in which one party's gain is equal to the loss of the other party – the sum of their gains and losses equals zero (Edge, 2011). In turn, according to S. Pinker, in a zero-sum game, a rational actor, who aspires to the highest gain possible for himself, tends simultaneous to seek the greatest loss to the other actor (Edge, 2011). However, the various problems that arise in everyday life do not always have linear solutions. The branch of Game Theory that best represents the world in which we live in is called theory of non-zero sum games. This differs from the theory of zero-sum games as there are no universally accepted solutions (Starr and Ho, 1969). In other words, there is no single optimal strategy that is preferable to all others nor predictable results (Rachmilevitch, 2011). To illustrate this point, Kofi Annan, in a speech on March 4, 2010, noted that "in the modern and interconnected world, power and prosperity are not a zero-sum game" (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2010: 7). According to Steven Pinker, a non-zero sum game is an interaction in which some combinations of actions provide a clear gain (positive sum) or loss (negative sum) to actors (Edge, 2011). Still according to Pinker, in a positive-sum game, a rational actor (…), can benefit the opponent with the same choice susceptible to favour their own interests (Edge, 2011). Simply put, positive sum games are 'win-win' situations, where 'everyone wins'. Indeed, non- zero-sum games are also not strictly competitive, unlike zero-sum games (totally competitive) as, generallly speaking, the actors of a non-zero sum game have both complementary interests and opposite interests (Aumann, 1987).
Ruggie's perception of the constructivist focus on ideas differs from the rationalist perspective as this, according to the author, does not cover 'normative factors' and ignores totally or partially, the role of ideas (Ruggie, 1998: 864). Another important difference between rationalism and constructivism concerns the contrast between homo economicus and homo sociologicus (Green and Shapiro, 1994). While the former is perceived as "a calculating machine that carefully evaluates different types of actions, choosing the one(s) that provide(s) the most effective means to achieve certain ends", the second is "a follower of rules that acts by force of habit, or decides what to do by putting the question 'how should a person with my role (or my identity) act in view of certain circumstances?" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 60).
The core of the debate between rationalism and constructivism is ontological, regarding the "composition of the international system" (Wendt, 1999: 35). In this sense, Checkel suggests that "constructivism is likely to be a bridge between the dominant theories and post-modernism in International Relations, exerting a kind of epistemological and ontological equilibrium" (1998: 327). As James Fearon and Alexander Wendt highlight, rationalism tends to assume "an individualist ontology, in which wholes are reducible to interacting parts", and constructivism to take "a holist ontology, in which parts exist only in relation to wholes" (2002: 52). In other words, by showing the consequences as something calculated in terms of gains by rational agents, Game Theory is the obvious vehicle for individualism" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 184). In turn, Wittgenstein's conception, focusing on constitutive rules which aim to assign a meaning to events, is an obvious vehicle to holism" (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 184). According to Fearon and Wendt, "what makes, however, the comparison between them interesting is that they conceive society from opposing points of view", i.e. "rationalism from a lower level to a higher level (bottom-up), and constructivism from ‘top to down' (top-down)” (2002: 53).
Although we recognize the usefulness and relevance of Game Theory, and therefore of a rationalist analysis, we consider, in the light of the debate explain vs understand that both have several limitations susceptible to harm the attempt to perceive the phenomena studied in this dissertation. In fact, an exclusively rationalist analysis would be reductive and inappropriate, since foreign policy decisions are not based only on rational criteria. Instead, they "are the result of a process where choices are often unintended consequences of interactions between agents and groups, whose behaviour does not fit [to the standards of analysis] of Game Theory" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 138). Hence the weight, among others, of peer pressure or bureaucratic politics. Moreover, the fact that Game Theory focuses too much on the stage of decision is also quite reductive, since "much of foreign policy’s behaviour stems from the way this is implemented", which causes that "to explain decisions or choices" is not the same as" explaining behaviour" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 138). Furthermore, it is important to question whether Game Theory is a theory "about how players think" or, rather, about "how the logic of a given setting/situation makes them behave", which are completely different aspects (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 141).
Moreover, Game Theory tends to perceive the state as the unit, the player in international politics, underestimating domestic bureaucracy that often plays a key role in foreign policy decisions (Myerson, 1997). The emergence of the phenomenon of transnationalism and interdependence, in recent decades, has contributed to strengthen the view that "states are not the only actors; the distinction between domestic and international societies is less clear than before; and international politics seems to be less and less influenced by military factors, and more and more by economic matters" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 35). According to Mansbach and Vasquez (1981), [traditional] power politics were replaced by others, within which the actors gather around political and economic issues. Unlike a model that explores the actors’ rationality, primarily at the unit level-state, a hermeneutic analysis takes into account the personality of who decides (Esengul, 2009). According to Hollis and Smith, "in fact, personality is a crucial factor", bearing in mind "the set of beliefs of each policymaker" (1990: 161). Therefore, these arguments prove the limitation of Game Theory to explain, for example, the emergence of sub-national, supranational and transnational actors, such as multinational corporations, with specific areas of interest, which may challenge the state dominance (Keohane and Nye, 1972).
Moreover, Game Theory is based on the (wrong) assumption that "the players understand the rules, can communicate, or at most, their strategies are understood by the other actors", and assigns "an equal importance to rewards/gains" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 139). However, "different cultures and societies evaluate gains differently" and the very own rules of the game are also "perceived often differently, depending on each culture" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 139). Another limitation of Game Theory is that "it does not deal well with the fact that the strategies followed by individuals depend on their propensity to take risks", which is important in terms of international relations "because of the different cultures and sets of values involved" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 139). Moreover, Game Theory seems to "ignore morality" rather than "technical knowledge, analytical logic and rational choice", although the ethical and moral issues "are at the centre of political debate" and of "policymaking" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 140). Finally, applicability of Game Theory must be questioned, since there are two different views about its role: one as a "tool to predict and explain what happens in situations with an objective structure idealized by theory", the other "as an effective way to evaluate a given situation only if the players decide to use it for this purpose (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 140-141).
Conclusion
In conclusion, given Game Theory limitations, we believe a hermeneutic analysis is extremely important, supported by a constructivist perspective hoping to interpret action 'from within'. This analysis favours understanding the reasons behind games played by states, on which they define their identity and which may or may not change their interests, as a result from interacting with the social world. Contrary to Game Theory, constructivism, is interested in understanding "how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact within the social construction of reality", and "more than only consider how structures constitute the identity and the interests of agents, it also intends to explain the process by which individual agents socially construct these structures" (Adler, 1999: 216).
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